Nelson Amaro
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Decentralization, local Government and... - 2006/07/13 06:24
DECENTRALIZATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CUBA
Nelson Amaro
[ pulse aquí para leer una versión en español ]
The collapse of socialist regimes after 1989 reflects more bankruptcy than political change. The “old revolutionaries” and/or “counter-revolutionaries”—depending on the perspective—have been left unemployed. Before, a subversive agenda existed for “would be” destroyers or builders of “Ancient Regimes,” “Betrayed Revolutions,” and “Restorations.” Their prescriptions were very similar to the way Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba. These prescriptions were summarized, with historic descriptions, in Curzio Malaparte’s (1932) classic book on “coup d’etat techniques,” a very popular book in Cuba prior to Batista’s departure.1
The demise of socialism does not come about in this way. At some point in time, the parties in power realize that the system does not function as it was anticipated and begin to remedy this situation through policies to manage the regime effectively. Policy prescriptions run in the direction of establishing “market” mechanisms. These reforms tend to be temporary orthodox economic measures. For example, Lenin’s “New Economic Policy (NEP)” relatively soon after socialism began in the Soviet Union.
Former socialist countries followed this same pattern in 1989. The degree to which they allowed autonomy at the enterprise level varied, permitting some decisions to be based partly on costs, prices and earnings. Recent research suggests that these reforms come in cycles. They intend to solve critical shortterm economic problems, but in the long run they do not address the root of the problem. These deeper obstacles were related to the basic premises of the socialist system itself.2 They attempted to correct the “Stalinist” version of socialism derived from the experiences of the former Soviet Union since 1917, later extended to Eastern European countries after the Second World War.
The realistic alternative is to change the system. The economic breakdown associated with “bankruptcy” has opened the way for political transformations of the system.3 Cuba, however, is an exception to this last generalization. Some have argued that the Cuban regime, resilient to the changes needed, may become a “socialist museum.”4 This thought is widespread among many Cuban intellectuals who are attempting to search for answers to the situation within the island.
This conceptual paper will discuss the present situation in Cuba and different alternatives that may help to extend economic changes to the political sphere. It will describe the objectives and transitions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in an effort to derive lessons that might be helpful in analyzing the Cuban situation. Furthermore, it will examine the extent to which “capitalist” thinking has been introduced into the Cuban political, legal and social structures regarding decentralization, local government and citizen participation. Finally, it will suggest major ways in which the Cuban experience differs from that of other countries, particularly those in Latin America.
In addition, this paper will suggest measures that are needed to bring Cuban decentralization, local government and participation efforts in line with other countries, particularly Latin American and the Caribbean nations, that are in the mainstream of modernization of the state and strengthening of municipal governments.
1. The coup d’etat required general crises in a country coupled with “revolutionaries” who had the political will to control through action the regime’s central systems of command posts, communications and infrastructure.
2. See Kaminski (1994). Poland passed through these stages in 1956-58, 1964-65, 1969-70, 1971-73, 1981-83 and 1988-89. “However, once each of the crisis was eased, Polish radical components of the reform were typically dropped. Thus, politics played a major role” (p. 154).
3. The best description of this process is given in Solnick (1996). What is important is the expectations of lower agents in the bureaucracy that perceive breakdowns in “property rights” and hierarchy structures to their advantage. The generalization used by this author is similar to the inverse of a “panic” or “depositors’ run” affecting a specific bank. When panic reaches its peak, all principals (clients) run to save what belongs to them of what is left. The inverse relationship refers to the fact that in the case of systemic bankruptcy, panic stems from top authorities when is confirmed by them that lower agents in the chain of command are challenging their control and they do not want to appeal to force or punishment for compliance. At that point in time, all actors make decisions to capture power and resources (institutions, enterprises and fiscal benefits) for their own use. The system—namely the authority, power and political structures—then break down. This is different from a “coup d’etat” or a revolutionary take over.
4. For example, see a recent work by a Cuban living inside the island that still has hopes of survival, Juan Antonio Blanco (circa 1996). Blanco says: “Cuba is today, certainly, a museum and a promise” (p. 2).
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